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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2) (k) (1994) .
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Appellant

Sonji

K.

Walker

attempted

to

establish

the

negligence of Appellee Parish Chemical Company through use of the
res

ipsa

loquitur

doctrine.

Parish's

Motion

for

Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial
challenged the sufficiency of Walker's proof on the foundational
elements of the doctrine.

Consequently, the only issue presented

for review is whether the trial court correctly concluded the
evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite foundation for
res ipsa loquitur.
This Court reviews the ruling using the same standard applied
by the trial court.
viewing

the evidence

The motion was property granted "if, after
in the light most

favorable

to the non-

movant, " the Court finds any one of the res ipsa

foundational

elements is not supported by competent evidence.

King

v.

Fereday,

739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Walker

brought

this

action

on August

18, 1992,

alleging

personal injuries suffered as a result of a fire on the premises of
1

Parish Chemical Company in Orem, Utah.
complaint

alleges

several

(R. 1-5)

different

Although Walker's

theories

of

recovery,

ultimately she pursued only a negligence claim based on the res
ipsa doctrine.

(R. 1016)

The matter was first tried to a jury beginning on November 29,
1993.

(R. 180)

On December 1, 1993, the jury learned Parish's

counsel was in the midst of a family emergency.

Walker moved for

a mistrial, and the motion was granted over Parish's objection.
(R. 177)
The second jury trial began on December 19, 1994.

(R. 284)

Parish's motion to dismiss at the end of Walker's case was denied.
(R. 282-83)

The trial court also denied Parish's motion for a

directed verdict at the close of all evidence.

(R.281)

The jury

returned a Special Verdict on December 21, 1994, finding Parish
negligent and awarding Walker special and general damages totalling
$21,700.00.

(R. 285)

The trial court entered its Judgment on

Special Verdict on January 12, 1995.

(R. 307)

Parish filed a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial.

(R. 314)

After

extensive briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued its
Memorandum Decision on April 28, 1995, granting Parish's motion and
denying the alternative motion for new trial.

(R. 425)

On May 18,

1995, the court entered its Order based on the Memorandum Decision
2

and its Judgment setting aside the Special Verdict and dismissing
Walker's claims.
B.

(R. 432 and 437)

Statement of Facts.
The evidence in the case is most significant for what it does

not show.

For example, no one knows how the Parish fire started.

(R. 806, 858, 914 & 946)

The fire occurred on a holiday.

Although

a few Parish employees were working in the building earlier in the
day, at the time of the fire no Parish employee was present.

(See

plaintiff's Exhibit 18)
The only witness to testify in an arguably expert capacity was
Russell Ted Peacock, the Director of Public Safety for the City of
Orem.

Mr. Peacock assigned two of his people to investigate the

fire.

(R. 802)

Despite their efforts, and those of a federal

investigative agency, the cause of the fire was never determined.
(R. 803)

Mr. Peacock testified building fires have many causes and

the official determination of cause is often "unknown origin."
803-04)

(R.

The exact cause of this fire remains, officially and

unofficially, unknown.
Mark Karamesines, the Parish plant manager, and Dr. Walter
Wesley Parish, the company president, both speculated concerning
possible causes of the fire.

Mr. Karamesines listed the electric

ceiling lights, the electrical outlets, lightning and arson as
"potential sources of ignition."
3

(R. 838 and 846)

Dr. Parish

identified

a few possibilities, including arson and a ballast

malfunction in one of the fluorescent lights.

(R. 934 & 1038)

No

evidence was presented, however, as to the actual cause of the
fire, and none of the possibilities listed by Mr. Karamesines or
Dr. Parish included negligence on the part of Parish.
Walker claims Dr. Parish admitted the fire started from one of
two causes, either improper chemical storage or arson.

The claim

is based on a misreading of the trial testimony:

(R.

Q.

Now Sir, again to switch ground on you.
If the fire
started in Stockroom "A" you would concede, would you
not, that it started either through improper storage or
the handling of the materials in that room or by the
intentional act of someone?

A.

I would not.

Q.

Please turn to your deposition . . . .
To sum it up
then, I understand that as far as the chemicals being a
hazard, a fire hazard in particular, they would only be
a hazard or a fire would only start in Storage Room "A"
as a result of two things then.
Either someone
improperly stored them, leaks or spills or didn't clean
up a spill or whatever, otherwise there may have been
negligence or there was arson, but by putting the bottles
next to each other, to use your word, "doesn't constitute
a fire hazard."
So the fire would either have had to
start in one of those two ways. Either someone went into
that room and started the fire intentionally or there was
an improper storage which you have of course expressly
denied, is that fair, and you responded?

A.

That is pretty fair. The room was inspected on a fairly
regular basis. I mean there was someone in that room
every day.

933-34) .

This

testimony

shows

only

(1) that

Dr.

Parish

expressly denies improper storage as a cause of the fire, and (2)
4

that Dr. Parish believes arson is a possible cause.

In response to

the first question, Dr. Parish refused to concede improper storage.
Counsel for Walker then read a different question from Dr. Parish's
deposition:

"Either someone went into that room and started the

fire intentionally or there was an improper storage which you have
Id.

of course expressly denied . . . ."

(emphasis added)

By his

answer Dr. Parish simply meant arson is possible and "it is fair to
say I expressly deny improper storage."
Walker

resorts

to misleading

bolster her position.

references

in an attempt

to

She states Mr. Karamesines "admitted that

there are substances which when mixed could constitute a fire
hazard."
is that

Brief of Appellant at 6.
the

stockroom

statement

What Walker fails to point out

had nothing

to do with

"substances" in

"A", the room in which the fire apparently

Regarding

the

chemicals

in

stockroom

"A",

Mr.

started.

Karamesines

testified:
Q.

If the chemicals came in contact in the room the
potential source of ignition was the chemicals themselves
is that fair?

A.

Well, actually are you aware of a combination of
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are
compounds there that if mixed would be a potential source
of ignition.

(R. 842-43)

5

Walker
states:

continues

"Mr.

to

misinterpret

Karamesines

testified

the
that

testimony
when

when

she

oxidizers

and

flammables come together they can start fires." Brief of Appellant
at 6.

The testimony was different in an important way:
Q.

And oxidants can accelerate or be involved in the cause
of fires can it not?

A.

Yes.

Q.

As particularly when combined with flammables correct?

A.

Can yes.

(R. 823)

Although Mr. Karamesines agreed these chemicals can "be

involved in the cause of fires," he did not state "they can start
fires."

The difference is significant because what started the

Parish fire is the real issue.

Many everyday items are flammable,

but they do not burn without a source of ignition, they do not
"start fires."
Walker claims:

"Mr. Karamesines could not

rule out

that

chemicals in the room could be a source of ignition in and of
themselves."

Brief

of

Appellant

at

6.

Actually,

Karamesines could not rule out was the possibility

of a

what

Mr.

potential

event:
Q.

If the chemicals came in contact in the
potential
source
of
ignition
was
the
themselves. Is that fair?

room the
chemicals

A.

Well, actually are you aware of a combination of
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are

compounds there that if mixed would be a potential source
of ignition.
Q.

...
I want to know if you, as the plant manager, can
rule that out given the contents of that room?

A.

I wouldn't rule that out, no.

(R. 842-43)

Mr. Karamesines could not rule out the possibility of

a particular unidentified combination of chemicals coming together
in some unspecified way to be a potential source of ignition.

But

no one offered evidence suggesting the potential event actually
occurred, or even probably occurred.
Walker

also

elicited

speculation

from

Mr.

Karamesines

regarding matters at least one step removed from an actual fire.
For example, Walker points out Mr. Karamesines1
"flammable

fumes" were

a possibility

containers ruptured or broke.

in

the

testimony that

room

Brief of Appellant at 6.

if

certain

Without a

source of ignition, however, the flammability of the chemicals or
the ceiling tile or the light fixtures or anything else in the room
is irrelevant.
The paper on which this brief is printed is flammable.

If it

were to burn in an unexplained fire, there could be no reasonable
suggestion that the person last in possession of the brief was
negligent.

How the fire started is the issue, and Mr. Karamesines'

testimony provided nothing more than a choice of possibilities,

7

none of which was established as likely or even more likely than
another possibility.
Likewise, Walker elicited nothing from Dr. Parish other than
unsupported possibilities.

Walker notes Dr. Parish "admitted that

the two particular types of chemicals which would be more likely
than others to start a fire when mixed together would be oxidizers
and reducing agents."
neither

Brief of Appellant at 8.

Dr. Parish nor

anyone

else placed

Again, however,

these

chemicals

in

stockroom "A" . Moreover, there was no evidence suggesting these or
any other chemicals had been "mixed together" in the room.

Indeed,

Mr. Karamesines inspected the room for possible hazards roughly an
hour before the fire and found everything in place, nothing was
spilled and no chemicals were mixed together.

(R. 812-13, 853-54)

Walker claims Dr. Parish agreed "[t]he only sources for the
fire

. . . were the chemicals themselves and their potentially

reactive capabilities."

Brief of Appellant at 9.

overlooks the remainder of the quote.

But Walker

The testimony came from Dr.

Parish's deposition:
Q.

A.

Question on Line 22, okay, so the only sources for the
fire sir in that building, were the chemicals themselves
and their potentially reactive capabilities. That is the
only source of ignition if you exclude some third person
that came in the building, isn't that fair and you
responded on Line 2, Page 256?
I guess that it fair.

8

(R. 93 6)

None of the witnesses excluded "some third person that

came in the building" as a cause of the fire.1

Furthermore, Dr.

Parish and Mr. Karamesines both testified about other possible
sources, including the lights and the electrical outlets.
Walker ? s distortion of the evidence continues when she refers
to

" [a] statement Dr. Parish had given as a part of the fire

investigation

.

.

.

."

Brief

of

Appellant

at

9.

Walker

incorrectly characterizes the written "statement" as Dr. Parish's
testimony and opinion.

The statement was actually created by Larry

Ballard, the Orem City Fire Marshall.
not testify.

(R. 872)

Mr. Ballard did

Dr. Parish admitted he talked with Mr. Ballard and

that what Mr. Ballard wrote "is essentially what we talked about,
but these are Mr. Ballard's words . . .
words."

I did not speak these

(R. 93 2)

At the time of the Ballard interview, Dr. Parish had not yet
been in the building since the fire started.

(R. 961)

Mr. Ballard

asked him to speculate about a possible explosion in a "reaction
vessel."

(R. 93 0 and 962)

Dr. Parish gave the speculation Mr.

Ballard later reported, but Dr. Parish "did not believe it at the
time of the interview."

(R. 963)

Mr. Karamesines was asked to

*Walker notes "[t]here was no evidence presented at trial that
someone had intentionally started the fire." Brief of Appellant at
5.
It is also true no evidence was offered showing improper
storage or any other condition attributable to Parish which could
have started the fire.
9

comment on the speculation and testified:

"There was a cause for

the fire and it definitely was not this 30 gallon reaction vessel
which I know to have been completely intact after the fire."

(R.

873)
Finally, Walker refers to Dr. Parish's testimony regarding a
fluorescent light ballast Dr. Parish once saw catching fire, and
states:

"Dr. Parish did not explain why, while Parish Chemical

thought the ballast has a propensity for explosions, the company
did not remove the ballast from a room where flammable materials
were stored."

Brief of Appellant at 9.

Dr. Parish never testified

that the ballasts had a "propensity for explosions."

He stated the

opposite:
Q.

You believe that an explosion in the ballast in Stockroom
"A" is one of the possible causes of this fire?

A.

Well, it is not really an explosion. The ballast simply
catches on fire and burns, and hot burning tar drips out
of the ballast. If that happens it can cause a problem.
I have only seen it happen once.
I have heard of it
happening. It is a rather infrequent occurrence. It is
not something you expect but it is a possibility.

(R. 1038)
In addition to using inaccurate and incomplete references,
Walker distorts the factual picture of this case by failing to
separate

the

possibilities.

evidence

of

circumstances

from

the

testimony

on

The two are mixed together in Walker's statement of

facts, but of course only the factual evidence is meaningful.
10

The

testimony on possibilities is pure speculation and conjecture since
no one established any possibility as likely.
Walker used no expert to testify as to the cause of the fire.
Messrs.

Parish

investigators.

and

Karamesines

are

chemists,

not

fire

No expert was produced to opine that this fire was

the result of negligent actions on the part of Parish or that fires
of this kind can only occur when negligence occurs.

As the trial

court correctly concluded, the jury was not entitled to rely on the
speculation and without it, the circumstantial evidence did not
provide the requisite res ipsa foundation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the trial court denied Parish's Motion for a Directed
Verdict, it was "deemed to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by
the motion."

Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) . The legal question raised by

the directed verdict motion, and the later Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding

the Verdict, was whether

the evidence met

the

foundational requirements for application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.

The answer reached by the trial court

is the same

reached in almost every other res ipsa case involving a fire of
unknown origin.

Our common knowledge and experience tell us that

fires occur frequently without negligence.

When Walker failed to

offer evidence to refute our common knowledge and experience, when
11

she failed to establish that the fire was of a kind which, in the
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had Parish used
due care, she failed to prove the first res ipsa element.
Likewise, Walker failed to prove the second res ipsa element.
She offered no evidence to "trace the cause of the fire to an
instrument

Barnhill

for which

v.

the defendant

Young Electric

Sign

was

Company,

responsible

.

.

.

."

374 P. 2d 311, 312 (Utah

1962) . Walker offered several theories, and elicited testimony on
several possibilities, but none of the theories or possibilities
was supported by evidence.
The jury was left to arrive at its conclusion by speculation,
conjecture or a choice of possibilities based on speculation and
conjecture.

The law requires more.

Since Walker failed to provide

more, the res ipsa doctrine does not apply and the trial court
correctly granted Parish's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict.
ARGUMENT
Lacking

proof

of

specific

negligence,

Walker's

case

was

necessarily predicated on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Res

ipsa is an evidentiary rule which allows an inference of negligence
to be drawn if a plaintiff first establishes the requisite factual
foundation by proving three elements:

12

(1)
the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary
course of events, would not have happened had the
defendant used due care;
(2) the agency or instrumentality causing the accident
was at the time of the accident under the exclusive
management or control of the defendant; and
(3) the plaintiff's own use or operation of the agency
or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the
accident.

King

v.

Searle

Pharmaceuticals,

Inc.,

832 P. 2d 858, 861 (Utah

1992) .
The res ipsa doctrine lightens a plaintiff's burden of proof
in the appropriate case.

That is, where a plaintiff can prove the

foundational elements, the doctrine forgives the obligation to show
a specific act of negligence.

Thus, if Walker could have proved

the Parish fire started when two incompatible chemicals came into
contact, she would have satisfied the second res ipsa element -she would have traced "the cause of the fire to an instrument for
which the defendant was responsible . . . . "
Electric

Sign

Co.,

Bamhill

374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962).

v.

Young

Assuming she

proved the rest of the factual foundation, the jury would have had
a proper basis from which to infer the two chemicals came into
contact as a result of Parish's negligence.
But

the

law

of

res

ipsa

foundational facts by inference.
the

jury

could

not

properly

does

allow

proof

of

the

Contrary to Walker's assertion,

infer
13

not

the

fire

started

when

two

chemicals

came into contact.

To rely on res ipsa Walker was

required to offer facts showing how the fire started.
loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself."
Andrews,

Res ipsa

As noted in Emigh

v.

191 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948):

[this] means the thing or instrumentality
involved speaks
for itself. It clearly does not mean the accident
speaks
for itself. It means that when the initial fact, namely
what thing or instrumentality caused the accident has
been shown then, and not before, an inference arises that
the injury or damage occurred by reason of the negligence
of the party who had it under his exclusive control.
Id.

at 903 (emphasis in original).
Whether a case should go to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur

theory is a question of law.
N.W.2d

495, 497

Raines

v.

(Minn. App. 1994) .

Sony

Corp.

The issue

of America,

is whether the

plaintiff established the requisite evidentiary foundation.
832 P.2d at 861.

523

King,

In this case, Walker was not entitled to a res

ipsa loquitur instruction because she failed to establish the first
two elements.

She failed to show that "the accident was of a kind

which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened
had due care been observed . . . . "
719, 722

Ballow

v. Monroe,

699 P. 2d

(Utah 1985) , and she could not "trace the cause of the

fire to an instrument for which . . . [Parish] was responsible."
Barnhill

v. Young Electric

Sign

Co.,

374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962) .

Consequently, the trial court correctly granted Parish's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
14

POINT I:

FIRES OCCUR FREQUENTLY WITHOUT ANYONE'S FAULT.

Walker's

case never got past the first res ipsa element.

Walker could not show "the accident was of a kind which, in the
ordinary

course

of

events,

would

defendant used due care . . . ."

not

King,

have

happened

had

the

832 P.2d at 861.

This element can be established in one of two ways.

Walker

could have referred to "the common knowledge and experience of the
community with respect to how such events generally occur."
862.

Id.

at

If, however, "the probabilities of a situation are outside

the realm of common knowledge," expert testimony is necessary to
prove the element.

Ballow,

699 P. 2d at 722; King,

832 P. 2d at 862.

The only arguably expert testimony on fires came from Russell
Ted Peacock, the Director of Public Safety for the City of Orem.
Although Mr. Peacock's prior employment and experience involved
only

police

work,

he

had

a

supervisory

role

over

the

fire

department during his thirteen years as Director of Public Safety.
Mr. Peacock gave no testimony from which one might conclude
the Parish fire "was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of
events, would not have happened had due care been observed . . . ."
Ballow,

699 P.2d at 722.

The only other evidence concerning how fires generally occur
came from a non-expert, Mark Karamesines, the Parish plant manager,
who testified:
15

As a person with some mechanical experience I recognize
that it is possible for a fire to be started by a great
many different causes. I think that electrical wiring or
lights, etc., are known pretty much to anyone as a
potential fire hazard.
(R. 841)

Mr. Karamesines and Dr. Parish (another non-expert) both

speculated concerning possible causes of the Parish fire.

But no

other evidence was offered concerning how fires generally occur.
Walker failed to prove the first res ipsa element when she could
not show the fire "was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of
events, would not have happened had due care been observed . . . ."
Ballow,

699 P.2d at 722.

Walker's inability to prove the first res ipsa element was not
surprising since common knowledge and experience tell us fires
frequently occur without negligence.

As Professors Prosser and

Keeton point out:
[T]here are many accidents which, as a matter of common
knowledge, occur frequently enough without anyone's
fault. A tumble downstairs, a fall in alighting from a
standing bus or street car, . . . a fire
of
unknown
origin,
will not in themselves justify the conclusion
that negligence is the most likely explanation; and to
such events res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
Prosser

and

Keeton

on Torts

§3 9 at 246 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes

omitted, emphasis added).
The conclusion reached by Professors Prosser and Keeton is
supported by almost every res ipsa case involving a fire of unknown

16

origin.

Jerome

In

Thriftway

Drug,

Inc.

v.

Winslow,

111 P.2d 1033

(Idaho 1986), the Idaho Supreme Court observed:
Our common knowledge and experience, or that of a jury,
would not justify the inference that the accident would
not have happened in the absence of negligence in that
there are many possible causes for a building fire in the
absence of negligence.
Id.

at 1037.

In Appalachian

Insurance

Co.

v.

G.B.

Knutson,

242

F.Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1965), the Court noted that "Kansas law, in
full accord with the law of every other jurisdiction that has
passed on the specific question, proceeds on the postulate that the
experience

of mankind

is that

fires may and

do

in fact

have

multiple causes, some of which involve negligence and some of which
do not . . . ."

Id.

at 237-38.2

Parish1 s survey of Utah law found four cases in which the res
ipsa doctrine is invoked in an attempt to establish liability for
a fire.

Barnhill

v.

Young

Electric

2

Sign

Co.,

3 74 P.2d 311 (Utah

See Royal Ins.
Co. v. United Parcel
Service,
Inc.,
147 F.R.D.
15 (E.D. N.Y. 1992), aff'd 992 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1992) (concluding
res ipsa inapplicable when no proof that the fire would probably
not have occurred in the absence of negligence) ; Milwaukee
Land Co.
v. Basin Produce
Corp.,
396 F.Supp. 528 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (holding
res ipsa not applicable because fires occur in the absence of
negligence); Foerster
v. Fischbach-Moore,
Inc.,
178 N.W.2d 258
(N.D. 1970) (agreeing res ipsa should not be submitted to jury
because fires frequently occur without negligence); In Re Estate
of
Morse,
391 P.2d 117 (Kan. 1964) (noting courts reluctant to apply
res ipsa to fire cases because fires frequently occur without
negligence on the part of anyone) ; Gutknecht
v. Wagner Bros.
Moving
& Storage
Co.,
266 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App. 1954) (holding res ipsa
inapplicable because fires commonly occur where care has been
exercised as well as where care has been wanting).
17

1962) focuses on the second res ipsa element in concluding the
"trial court properly refused to allow the jury to speculate" on
the cause of a building fire.

Id.

Fuel

(Utah 1956), also focused on the

Supply

Co.,

second element

302 P.2d 471

at 314.

Wightman

v.

Mountain

in noting proof of how a natural gas explosion

occurred "cannot rest upon speculation or conjecture, nor upon a
mere choice of possibilities."

Id.

at 473.

Logan

v.

Peterson,

604

P. 2d 488 (Utah 1979) , involved a house fire of unknown origin.

The

trial court focused on the third res ipsa element in concluding the
doctrine does not apply.

The Supreme Court affirmed on other

grounds.
In Ballow

v.

Monroe,

699 P.2d 719

(Utah 1985), the Supreme

Court's review turned on the first res
claimed

Monroe

was

responsible

for

a

ipsa element.
fire

which

Ballow

spread

from

Monroe's land onto Ballow 1 s, burning 100 acres of Ballow's wheat.
No one could say how the fire started.

The trial court refused to

submit the case to the jury on a res ipsa theory, and the jury
returned a verdict for Monroe.
Focusing on the first element, the Supreme Court affirmed,
pointing out:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application
unless it can be shown from past experience that the
occurrence causing the disability is more likely the
result of negligence than some other cause . . . .

18

Id.

at 722 (quoting Talbot

Hospital,

v. Dr.

W.H. Groves1

440 P.2d 872, 873-4 (Utah 1968)).

Latter-Day

Saints

The "past experience"

referred to by the court is the past experience of the community or
of an expert:
Since the res ipsa loquitur instruction permits the jury
to infer negligence from the happening of the accident
alone, there must be a basis either in common knowledge
or expert testimony that when such an accident occurs, it
is more probably than not the result of negligence.
Id.

In Ballow,

whether

a

the court concluded the evidence "cast no light" on

fire
Id.

negligence.

ordinarily

would

not happen but

for

someone's

at 723.

Likewise, in this case Walker failed to establish that fires
of unknown origin ordinarily only happen when someone is at fault.
On the contrary, the only arguably expert testimony established
that fires occur from many causes and that this particular fire
could have resulted from a number of causes, only one of which is
negligence. Walker offered no insight into the "common knowledge,"
but

as

the

court

noted

in Appalachian

Insurance,

the

law in

"every . . . jurisdiction that has passed on the specific question
proceeds on the postulate that the experience of mankind is that
fires may and do in fact have multiple causes, some of which
involve negligence and some of which do not . . . ."
Insurance,

242 F.Supp. at 237-38 (emphasis added).
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Appalachian

Walker tries to avoid characterizing the Parish fire as a fire
of unknown origin.

She knows this is the only characterization

supported by the facts, but she also knows res ipsa is almost never
applied in unknown origin fire cases.

Consequently, she tries to

undermine the characterization of the fire by attacking the way in
which the trial court arrived at the characterization.

She argues

the trial court improperly looked at fires "generally" rather than
looking at the particular facts of this case.
Walker's

criticism

is

unjustified.

The

record

contains

nothing to suggest the trial court ignored the facts of this case.
Walker points to Olswanger

v. Funk,

470 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1970), as a demonstration of the correct way to analyze the first
res ipsa element.

Reliance on Olswanger

actually highlights
evidence in Olswanger
fire.

the weaknesses

in Walker's position.

The

allowed a precise characterization of the

Plaintiff proved the fire originated in a couch in the

apartment rented by defendants.
fire" case.
said

is curious since the case

"a fire

Consequently, this was a "couch

The Tennessee Court of Appeals was correct when it
does not

ordinarily

originate

in a couch

apartment in the absence of negligence . . . ."
Unlike Olswanger,
not be identified.

in

an

Id.

the origin of the fire in this case could
Although Walker argues the chemicals somehow

started the fire, unlike the plaintiff in Olswanger,
20

Walker offered

no evidence on the point.
chemi' -.1? •=" "^; ' A

She introduced the possibility that the

,-•-,--•

•-- - -:acn _

r

—

other possibilities
.x

noted by tne witnesses vvere -.t least as ^.ix.ei\ .
evidence

shows the fire started

hiow]f. ]l --"

' 1 " vrav '-" n -^ "-

in stockroom
'

"A" .

best, the

Our common

~s start from a

number of causes, and Walker orterec >-•« evidence to refute that
common knowledge and experience i n this case.

Walker ai g i les the tr i al :> : i 1:1 : t app] i e :i a • : • : i: i d i ;i s:i < • e pre si impt
against use of tiie res ipsa doctrine - n : i_c ^ases.
finds no suppor:

r he recor,

ipsa L., establisn liability
occasional aberration appears

Tne argument

:s true, however, that trie

icr a fire or. unknown crigi.
:: the oase

-aw, but these almost

evidence shewing that the defendant should know hew tne fire
started, but refuses to testify.
i1: .-r;>- -

til

z:

first case cited by Walker i:„ _::is seo^un ui nei brief, is a good
example of th^ first exception.
r-iUcl^ L

Defendants conducted an auto

L..t:h --•

piaintift

Aithougn tne exact caude c: ;..- fire was unknown,

plaintiff called an expert who testified the vehicles parked ;n "he
garage gave off flammable gaso] :i i le , a/;: •• :>i s
21

Tl: le - •.. - i . _ »:^. . .

that "the most probable fuel involved in the fire was gasoline
vapor."

Id.

at

572.

The

expert

also

testified

as

to

the

"probable" way in which the gasoline vapors were drawn into a pilot
light, starting the fire.

Horner

Under these circumstances, the

case cannot be properly classified as an unknown origin fire case.
Expert testimony established the probable origin of the fire.
The other cases cited by Walker in support of her position on
the first res ipsa element are also distinguishable.
Co.

of

New

Jersey

v. Midgett,

116

involved both explosion and a fire.

F.2d

561

Standard

(4th Cir.

Oil
1941),

The most significant evidence

showed that the explosion occurred before the fire.

The trial

court

"that

focused

on

this

evidence,

charging

the

jury

the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied if, but only if, the
jury found that the explosion . . . was prior in time to the fire."
Id.

at 564.

telling.

The court's focus on the timing of the events is

The implication is that res ipsa applies in explosion

cases because explosions do not usually happen absent negligence.
The doctrine should not apply in unknown fire cases because fires
often happen without negligence.
Walker also cites Oakdale

Building

N.E.2d 231 (111. Ct. App. 1944) . Oakdale

Corp.

v.

Smithereen

Co.,

54

is an example of the kind

of fire case in which the res ipsa doctrine is often applied.

The

key point is that the defendant refused to put on any evidence
22

regarding the cause of the fire, so the court decided the defendant
was concealing knowledge about the fire.

The court stated:

Defendant may have had some knowledge aj ~^ n^.% the fire
originated; if not, it was certainly incumbent upon it to
offer evidence as to the nature of the work done in the
apartment, the materials used, and what its
representative did during the half hour that he had
control of the apartment, to rebut or overcome, if it
could, the circumstantial presumption of negligence. To
allow defendant to escape liability by concealing such
knowledge after plaintiffs had adduced all the evidence
that they possibly could under the circumstances would be
perversion of the rule upon which the doctrine is
founded.
I'd. az 22-

'!? ^r- evay: suggested Parish is concealing knowledge.

rta^Ker 'j^ _ _

- .• -

—i

support of che conclusion t;na^ cne cocnrine may apply even though
the exact cause of the f:r^ - ~ unknown
Tt

~ involve a a :;iree ye~...

?"cv/ler is n?r a fire case.
•

r--.

:

- ..

J3cd health, -\n i w=,^ picked up later wic'. a c r a m concussion.
I'rdal--.

the

r?k-icr.:-'.r decided

-h^ defendant

knew

happened L^Z wa.j /;i*.:.nc±c:ing z:>: ::.:::.:. .:..
[I]t appears that defendant had a guilty conscience and
tried to cover up the injury. Certainly, it appears that
defendant knew something had happened to plaintiff while
plaintiff was under her supervision.

From this evidence the jury could irner, re_-t^u:icijjjLy, LIICIL
the proffered explanation was false. This is important.
Here we have a defendant, who had supervision of a child
when the injury occurred, offering a false and certainly
an unsatisf^ntorv explanation. She was under a duty to
explain.
Where, under the evidence, an
23

whac

explanation is called for, if the defendant refuses to
explain or gives a false explanation, it is reasonably
inferable that the defendant is hiding something which,
more probably than not, is his negligence.
Id.

at 701-02.3

Again, there is no suggestion of concealment in

the present matter.
Finally, Walker

ends her

argument

element with a citation to Roland

Associates,

S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
booth.

Inc.

first
v.

res

Pierce,

ipsa
476

The fire originated in a paint

Defendant was actively working on the cleaning the booth at

the moment the fire started.
source

on the

of electricity.

The booth was not connected to any

In other words, there was

absolutely

nothing besides defendant's work which could have started the fire.
That fact, combined with defendant's refusal to offer evidence,
persuaded the court to allow the jury to decide the case based on
res ipsa.

3

The dissent in Fowler,
concurred in by Justice Traynor,
discusses the law in terms more consistent with current Utah law:
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not intended to open
the door for mere speculation as to the cause of an
injury.
Here a necessary prerequisite
for its
application was a showing
of
facts
sufficient to
establish that the accident was more probably
than
not
the result of defendant's negligence, for "in the absence
of such a probability there would be no basis for an
inference of negligence which would serve to take the
place of evidence of some specific act or omission."
Id.

at 703 (emphasis in original).
24

Professors Prosser and Keaton, the Utah Supreme Court and
a ] most every other jurisdiction which has an^Ivzed che issu^ V! ";
conclude res ipsa loquitur has no app-ic = Li.:. _n cases i:./._
fires

of

unknown

origin.

.;:;.;,

The

first

loctrine- -that

element

necessary

fires normally

to

do not

_
an

occur

without negligence - is simply contrary to our common knowledge and
experience.

Walker offered no expert

commc i i 1 :nowl pdqp

A

. exp~

testimony
—ri'"7

to refute our
, sue

tailed

to

establish the first res ipsa element.
POINT II: RES IPSA LOQUITUF iiA.l NO APPLICATION IN THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE SHOWING WHAT INSTRUMENTALITY CAU.—T THE FIRE.
ziigin.

The fire at Parish was a fire .:: unknown

unknown

origin

fire

cases

succinctly stated in Barnhill

a^.e
..

unsuccessfa..
.cung

Electric

Almost

-- reason
Sign

,o

Jo. , 274 ?.2i

3] ] (I J' ., .1 3 5 • 52) :
It is clear . . . that the doctrine cannot be invoked to
show negligence until "the initial fact, namely what
thing or instrumentality caused the accident has been
shown . . . . [T] hen and not before, an inference arises
that the injury or damage occurred by reason of the
negligence
of
the
party
who
had . , .
[the
instrumentality] under his exclusive control,"
Barnhi:i,

7^4 P,2d at 312 (quoting Emigh

Barnhill

involved

~. building

v. Andrews,

fire

of

131 P.2d 901,

unknown

origin.

Plaintiff contended circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant's
25

faulty installation and maintenance of a large electric sign as the
cause

of

the

fire.

The

trial

court

disagreed,

and

granted

defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme
concise, pointed manner.

Court

framed

the issue

in a

The court could have been discussing this

case when it asked:
"Did the plaintiff trace the cause of the fire to an
instrument for which the defendant was responsible so
that the cause of the fire was not left to conjecture?"
Id.

at 312.

The evidence in Barnhill

causes of the fire.

On the question of what caused the fire,

however, pointing out possibilities is not enough.
case,

the

Barnhill

instrumentality

possible

pointed to many

fire
or

could

not

cause
Id.

responsible . . . . "
204-05 (2d ed. 1955) ) .

"be

for

at 313

traced

which

to

As in this
a

specific

defendant

was

(quoting Prosser, Torts §42 at

Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded

"[t]he trial court properly refused to allow the jury to speculate
on this issue."

Id.

at 314.

The Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Emigh

v. Andrews,

191

P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948), provides a well-reasoned explanation of why
res ipsa should not be used under these circumstances.

Emigh

involved a fire which burned sixty acres of plaintiff's wheat.
Exactly how the fire started was unknown.
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Plaintiff could only say

that the fire started at a point over which defendant's truck had
passec immediately before.
i

-:.

i 1111

i 1 i I i Miusbiry plain1: J f t "' '•• • I^P, the it'uj] V

explained the second res ipsa element:
[The words res ipsa loquitur] simply means "the thing
speaks for itself."
.And that means the thing
or
instrumentality
involved speaks for itself. It clearly
does not mean the accident
speaks for itself. It means
that when the initial fact, namely what thing or
instrumentality caused the accident has been shown then,
and not before, an inference arises that the injury or
damage occurred by reason of the negligence of the party
who had i t under his exclusive control.
li. at 903 (emphasis in original)
Emigh

in

could

only

presume

.-"• • in this case,, the plaintiff
the

fire

instrumental-t_, unaej. aeiiiiua:.: - _. _.i^

was
--

caused

by

--— - i :)I l

:
r

an
^^s

insufficient to 1 r; the foundation for res ipsa:
_. tne mere cresumpticn
tf the initial cause of tne fire
trie further inference
is sought to be drawn that the
truck was defective or improperly operated.
Such an
inference cannot be drawn from a mere presumption. The
established rule is that liability cannot result from. an.
inference upon an inference or from a presumption upon a
presumption . . . .
The inference arises only from
established foundation facts. Manifestly the inference
cannot supply the foundation facts from which the
i nference avisos,
Id.

at 904 (citations omitted, emphasis in oi iginal) .
On the presumption that two chemicals somehow mixed to cause
• •• ::

chat

•" ""

Parish

;r]><-- -,:'-••>,:•- i *

improperly

allowed the mixing.

scored

i r~«/ - • further

its cnemica-..- i:i

inference

.i manner

which

This kind of inference upon inference does not
27

support liability.

Application of the res ipsa doctrine requires

a foundation based on facts, not presumptions or inferences.4
Mr. Peacock was the first witness to testify concerning what
caused the Parish Chemical fire.

Again, he offered nothing on

direct examination, but on cross examination he made it clear this
was a fire of unknown origin:
Q. Did you, as a result of that investigation, make an
official determination as to the cause of this fire?
A.

No, we did not.

Q. To your knowledge, was the cause of this fire ever
officially determined?
A. No, Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms Federal Agency was
there also. To my knowledge a determination as to the
cause of the fire has never been made.
(R. 802-03)
fire's

Mr. Peacock had no factual information about the

cause,

and

he

was

not

asked

to

speculate

or

list

possibilities.

4

See Jerome

Thriftway

Drug,

Inc.

v.

Winslow,

111 P.2d 1033,

1036 (Idaho 1986) (concluding " [t]he cause of fire cannot be
established
by
application
of the doctrine
of
res
ipsa
loquitur . . . ." Since plaintiff could not identify the origin of
the fire, "the 'instrumentality causing the injury' was not
established . . . . " ) ; Foerster
v. Fischbach-Moore,
Inc.,
178
N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1970) (holding case will not be submitted to jury
under res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff presented no evidence of
the cause of the fire, and fires frequently occur without
negligence); In Re Estate
of Morse,
391 P.2d 117 (Kan. 1964)
(noting res ipsa loquitur requires a clear showing of the thing or
instrumentality which started the fire); Smith v. Vanier,
307 P.2d
539 (Okla. 1957) (holding plaintiff must prove what caused the fire
before res ipsa may be invoked).
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I" _ontrast, Mr. Karamesines and Dr. Parish were both asked to
specula t:e aboi it the :ause of the fire . Mr. Karamesines testified:
Q.

What were the potential sources of ignition ?

A
There were electric ceiling lights. There were a few
electrical outlets installed in the walls of the room.
S3-_

(emphasis added

- .-- . .i^keo again regarding
^.. .z

.

" [sjomebody coulu :.^i~

.

-Th+:n: r T "

•

-md

talked ±.^ i::eie w^Lh ^ ^^Lcn or a ciowtcrch,
6-\h

that is possible

oc; :

"potential

emphasis added)
; W — .~i

-(A; -

Stock Rooni *A" * _. _ ; ''cotenciai source of ignition" for the fire.
C.
11 che chemicals came _. ronnact in the room the
potential
source
of
igniticr
; -i.-- the
chemicals
themselves . '-- *-- = - ^- : - ~
A.
Well, actually are you aware of a combination of
materials on the list that in fact would do that? I am
not sure I am aware. I couldn't tell you that there are
compounds there that if mixed would be a potential source
c^ icrniti^r
si

I want to know if you, as the plant manager,

c..._ . *- .- ... a" ~,,~ ci Tr ^n the contents o42 *-h = *- v o o m ?
;

(R

wouldn ' t. i ul-_- : i out, i 10 .

842-43)

In other words, Mr. Karamesines could not rule out the

possibi li t} r of a
7

Parish's -estimc/.y proceeded in a similar fashion.

Parish does n o h

know how the fire started.

f c .. - :V."-:..T J-_ iL'.j" -.

.i ;•

He agreed with the

|
I
Walker "
s c: oi n lsel i

29

Dr.

Now sir there are a number of things we don't know about
the fire.
Particularly, we don't know the original
source, well I should use the word "ignition."
For
example spark, whether it is a spark, chemical reaction,
spontaneous combustion, electrical, overheating or just
what that source of ignition is, . . . .
(R. 921)

Walker's counsel elicited testimony

from Dr. Parish

regarding the flammability of certain chemicals.

For example, Dr.

Parish testified that Stock Room "A" contained certain chemicals
which, if mixed together, would be "combustible."

(R. 924) Again,

however the issue is not combustibility, but what started the fire.
On this point neither Dr. Parish nor any other witness could offer
facts tracing "the cause of the fire to an instrument for which the
defendant was responsible."

Barnhill,

3 74 P.2d at 312.

Walker's only argument regarding the second element is that
Parish controlled stockroom "A". Whether or not true, the argument
is immaterial since stockroom "A" did not cause the injury.

A fire

which burned the contents of the stockroom caused the injury, and
Walker offered no evidence regarding the source of the fire.
Walker tries to avoid the flaw in her argument by ignoring
applicable law:
Thus, the control over the chemicals in Stockroom A was
established. The instrumentality causing the damage in
this case was the chemicals. The chemicals were the only
materials that could burn in Stockroom A and whether the
ignition was by blowtorch, by spark, or by burning light
ballasts, the instrumentality under the defendant's
control which caused the problem was the chemicals
themselves.
30

Brief of Appellant at 3 4 .

Logically extended,, the argument asks

* "-" } >:;• f ire is c:e resrcr.sib: 1 it v of ^'~- r^r^cn who
^wT:3 or connro^s cue tning our:.L ,

i __".^_. _ ...:.,

-i i i lg

cigarette into a garbage can, starting a fire which burns down a
responsible the person who owns the
garbage can or *..o c^acea
fire,

t:^ paper :ii i i tl i = • : 'an w 1: il ::1: i caugl it: : m: i

In res ipsa fire cases Utah law requires proof of the source
- Vrs-r-i rer--"r..
Victoria

(N.E.

Z-aik Apartments,

1 l ic.

IA'C^OC:;,

1985) provides good analysis on the

"for-:

: r-

"
*

- -.

"instrumentality"

' ' --? v

n-ti^-

landlord

against tenanc for damage caused Ly a .lie ^ tne apartment. 1'^
landlord's theory of ^r>- fire was that a cigarette was dropped
i »eLwe<

-

._

ignited r.he couc:

;

"

:

-y-d ind pvnnfually

lie North Dakota Cojrt rioted:

Victoria Park relies en Clswanger
v. Fu^k
.
vhich
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee indicated that the
defendant's exclusive control of the couch in which the
fire started was sufficient to satisfy the "exclusive
control" element of res ipsa loquitur. We question the
logic of a rule which would permit an inference of
negligence to arise merely from the defendant's control
over the object in which the fire originated or the area
which it originated. The far better rule . . . is that
"tl :i 2 ' thing' or ' instrumentality' which caused the fire
is required to be under the control of the defendant."
Id.

at 160 (citations omitted).
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-

The court stated that, under Victoria Park's theory, the thing
or instrumentality which caused the fire was the cigarette, not the
couch or the apartment:
Thus, in order for the instruction on res ipsa loquitur
to be given, it was incumbent upon Victoria Park to
present evidence from which the jury could determine that
[the tenant] had exclusive control over the cigarette
which ignited the fire.
At best, Victoria Park's
evidence created an inference that one of the three
persons present in the apartment that morning had control
over the offending cigarette; beyond that, the jury was
left to speculate as to which of the three was the
offending party.
Id.

The court concluded that, without evidence of who controlled

the cigarette, there is no basis for applying the doctrine.
Victoria

Park presented

doctrine than did Walker.
support

a stronger case

for applying

the

Victoria Park presented evidence to

its theory on how the fire started.

Walker presented

nothing but unsupported possibilities.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri

provided

a

particularly

thorough

analysis

application of res ipsa law to fire cases in Appalachian
Co.

v. G.B.

Knutson,

242 F. Supp. 226

(W.D. Mo. 1965) .

of

the

Insurance
The case

involved a fire of unknown origin which spread from defendants'
property and burned certain goods stored by plaintiff's insured in
a nearby warehouse.

After determining Kansas law prohibits the

application of res ipsa in the case, the court went on:
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Courts O'ther than Kansas who follow and apply the same
common law concepts of res ipsa loquitur have reached
exactly the same conclusion as Kansas. Such consistency
of treatment of cases involving unknown fires would tend
to fortify both the correctness of the Kansas law and our
determination of the state of that law.
Our research indicates that ever} case t;iat has squarely
considered the question of the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur to fires of unknown origin has reached a result
consistent with that reached by Kansas.
Id.

a~ 235.
i -v

Insurance

- -

Appalachian

: urisdictions reviewed by the

Courc weie,

_t

A*::..:--

__ h-n, decide I . .1

the grounds supporting Parish's position in this case.
trequeuLJ 1 ; ""(

ox both of

UP

t«"ires occu.t

-•:"'-:-:—^-- t^.d vh^n th^ fire is -i

origin, the case is, almost L,\ u^ii:_

:?-^:

unknown

- iy~ ^ -- rroof

that the instrumentality causing the fire was under the exclusive
contr....

i.-.-^-^z^

.

talker was not entitled to a res ipsa

loquitur instruction in ir.is case beet ...-.-•-:
thes^

f^rsr

rw^ ^ s

deciu_u

ipsa elements.
c- •. -

v

r;t

ra.'.t

The trial

court

^ i ^ ^ was completely

establish
correctly
devoid

of

competent evidence on chese essentia- ;. • .
CONCLUSION
1

:

*: r?'^-

unprotected plaintiff.

t itsa is to prevent injustice to an
However, it mu^- :.

equally blameless and unprotected defendarr

...

--t ;] :---^ tn

Application ..i tn.e

doctrine under these circumstances places an inequitable burden
upon the defendant.
The

trial

court

correctly

concluded

the

evidence

was

insufficient to establish the requisite foundation for res ipsa
loquitur.

Consequently,

the trial court's order and

should be affirmed.
Dated this

*-T

day of October, 1995.

R. SMlftf
ERIC P .

LEE
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